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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

THE STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

v.

:

RICHARD DALE HOUSTON,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

Case No. 20020526-CA

:

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS
Contrary to the State's argument, there is no reason to begin the 120-day
disposition period after December 14, 2001, which is the date of commencement. The
trial court found that the period began December 14th, when the prison records office
received Appellant Richard Dale Houston's 120-day disposition request, and the parties
both agreed with this finding. R. 85-87, 271 [6], 272 [18]. Further, the State cites no new
facts or legal support for its argument that the 120-day period should be counted from the
day after the commencement of the period instead of the day of commencement. And so,
this argument fails.
Likewise, the State's argument that the delay of the trial was justifiable because of
the defense counsel's scheduling conflicts fails. It is true that, when trial was rescheduled
due to an oversight on the part of the prosecutor, the defense counsel was out of town for
two subsequent weeks. R. 272 [18-19]. However, none of the days in the first week that

he was out of town were offered for trial anyway, because the trial court already had a
murder trial scheduled. IcL. Further, the record does not show whether any days in the
second week were available for trial. Certainly, the trial court did not offer any dates
during the second week, and the first dates offered were for half a month later. l±_ at 20.
These dates were at least 12 days past the 120-day deadline. And so, the delay of trial
was not justifiable, and this case should be reversed and dismissed.

ARGUMENT
I. THE STATE HAS NO BASIS FOR ITS CHALLENGE TO THE TRIAL
COURT'S UNCONTROVERTED FINDING THAT THE 120-DAY
DISPOSITION PERIOD ENDED APRIL 12 TH
Like Mr. Houston, the State agrees with the trial court that the 120-day disposition
period started on December 14, 2001, when the prison records office received Mr.
Houston's 120-day disposition request. R. 85-87, 271 [6], 272 [18]. However, the State
argues that the count for the 120-day period should actually not begin until the day after,
on December 15th, making the 120-day deadline in this case April 13, 2002 instead of
than April 12th. Appellee's Br. 12. For support, the State cites a footnote from this
Court's opinion of State v. Coleman. 2001 UT App 281, %6 n.7, 34 P.3d 790.
However, the footnote from State v. Coleman does not support the State's
argument. The footnote reads as follows:
The trial court found that the 120-day period commenced on November 16,
1999, the day after the Utah State Prison stamped Defendant's Notice
2

"received." Defendant contends that the 120-day period commenced on
October 28, 1999, the day Defendant allegedly executed the Notice.
Defendant argues that the prison received Defendant's Notice, and
therefore the 120-day period began, on October 28 based on the trial
court's statement, "the defendant filed his 120-day disposition papers on
October 28." Characterized as a finding, this statement would contradict the
trial court's "finding that the operative date to begin calculating the 120[]day period is November 16th." However, "when viewing the evidence in a
light most favorable to the trial court's ruling,... the trial court's use of the
November 16 date, the "received" stamp on Defendant's Notice, and the
lack of any other evidence supporting Defendant's position persuades us
that "the evidence is []sufficient to support the trial court's finding[]." . . .
Thus, we reject Defendant's assertion, and focus on the "good cause" step
of the analysis.
Coleman, 2001 UT App 281, | 6 n.7.
Contrary to the State's reading, this footnote does not hold that 120-day
disposition periods always begin on the day after the requests are received at the prison
records office. It does not even hold that in Coleman. What occurred in Coleman is that
the trial court counted the day after the request was received as "1." In other words, the
day after the request was received was counted as the first day, and the 120 days were
calculated from there. And, that is precisely what the trial court and the parties did in this
case when they calculated that the 120-day period ended on April 12th. R. 272 [18].
Here, the trial court and parties referred to the calendar together and agreed that
there were 120 days between December 14 th and April 12th, so the 120-day period ended
April 12th. IdL This is logical. There were 17 days left in December, including the 15th, 31
days in January, 28 in February, and 31 in March. This makes 107 days, leaving 12 left
on the 120-day period. And so, April 12 th was the deadline.
3

As in Coleman, there is no reason to overturn the trial court's finding on this
issue, particularly considering the fact that both parties agreed. R. 271 [6]. n[V]iewing
the evidence in a light most favorable to the trial court's ruling," Coleman. 2001 UT App
281, TJ6 n.7, the April 12th deadline is sufficiently supported and should not be
overturned. Further, the State has not pointed out any contrary evidence, nor explained
why there should be a one-day delay in beginning the 120-day period. And so, the State's
argument that April 11th, rather than April 12th was the 120-day deadline should be
rejected.

II. CONTRARY TO THE STATE'S ARGUMENT, WEEKS OF DELAY
CAUSED BY THE TRIAL COURT'S INABILITY TO SET TRIAL ARE
NOT ATTRIBUTABLE TO MR. COLEMAN
The State argues that a dismissal of this case under the 120-day disposition statute,
Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-1, is improper because the trial was set after the 120-day
deadline in part because of the defense counsel's scheduling conflicts. Appellee's Br. 1821. The State argues that it is irrelevant that the rescheduling was caused by the
prosecutor's failure to give the defense 30-day pre-trial notice of an expert witness. Id. at
21. What is important, according to the State, is that when trial was rescheduled, the
defense counsel had a scheduling conflict during one of the weeks prior to the 120-day
deadline. Id
However, this argument is not supported by the record and it is not a foregone

4

legal conclusion.
The transcript of the pretrial conference, when trial was rescheduled, shows that
trial was originally set for March 13 th, 14th, and 15th, and had to be rescheduled because
the State failed to provide 30-day notice of an expert witness for trial. R. 272 [3-12].
During the rescheduling, the trial court noted that, to accommodate the 30 days, trial
could not be set before March 27 th. IcL at 20. On the other hand, the 120-day deadline
was April 12th. IcL at 18. Unfortunately, there was no time between March 27 th and April
12th that trial could be scheduled. During the week of March 27 *, neither the trial court
nor the defense counsel was available. This is because the trial court had a murder trial
scheduled and the defense counsel was out of town. Ij±_ at 18-19. Then, during the week
beginning Monday, April 1st, the defense counsel was still out of town. IdL at 19. The trial
court did not mention whether any dates were available that week. During the week of
April 8th, the trial court could not schedule trial because it was on the "master
arraignment calender." IcL During the week of April 15th the trial court could not
schedule trial because it was on the "master pretrial calender." IcL_
This shows that only one week, that of April 1 st , may have been unavailable due to
the defense counsel's scheduling conflict. But this is uncertain because the court did not
discuss whether it was available for trial that week. Certainly, the week before, March
25-29, was not available for trial because the trial court had a murder case scheduled. IcL
at 18-19. And so, the fact that the defense counsel was also unavailable that week is

5

irrelevant. The weeks of April 8 and 15th were unavailable because of the trial court's
schedule, not the defense counsel's. All in all, this shows that the trial court, not defense
counsel, was at fault in the late scheduling of the trial. And, even though the defense
counsel was out of town the week of April 1 st , there are no factual findings, or even a
part of the record, that shows the court would have been able to schedule three trial days
that week.1 In these circumstances, the State's argument that the trial was late because of
the defense counsel's scheduling conflicts fails.
Nevertheless, the State argues that the defense counsel's scheduling conflict
justifies the late trial, and cites State v. Heaton as dispositive. However, State v. Heaton
is factually distinguishable from this case. In Heaton, the 120-day deadline was January
19, 1995. State v. Heaton, 958 P.2d 911,916 (Utah 1998). The trial court attempted to
set trial on the 19th itself, but trial was set beyond that date because both the defense
1

The only part of the record where the rescheduling is discussed, apart from the
rescheduling discussion itself, is during the motion hearing on April 22nd. There, the court
discussed the problems created by the 30-day notice requirement, and then turned to the
rescheduling. Of that, the court said:
The resetting was done as quickly as we could.... A number of days were
discussed and this was the first day that we could get all parties here, so the April
24th day, which is scheduled this week and which is apparently going forward, is a
reasonable date as the court calendar and every other circumstance could be taken
into consideration, if I find that it was not unreasonable to delay it because of the
expert witness issue and the conflict counsel issue
R. 271 [8].
However, this paragraph gives no information about the rescheduling, and the details
must be derived from the rescheduling discussion itself. And, there is no point in that discussion
where the trial court offers a date during the week of April 1st. R. 272 [17-21].
6

counsel and the prosecutor had scheduling conflicts on that date. IjdL_ Because trial was
not set, in part, because the defense counsel could not be there the 19 th , the trial delay
was justified by good cause. IcL at 917.
But in this case, the court did not try to set trial on the last day of the deadline. The
trial court had weeks to schedule the trial, but the first dates it suggested were April 24 th ,
25th, and 26th. R. 272 [20]. These dates were at least 12 days beyond the deadline.
Further, there was only one week in the preceeding weeks that may have been bypassed
because the defense counsel was out of town, but it is not clear whether that happened
because the trial court did not say whether there were three available days for trial that
week. Id at 18-19. Further, there are no findings to this affect.
In sum, the State's argument that this case should not be dismissed because of the
defense counsel's scheduling conflict fails. At most, even if it is assumed that the trial
court had three days available for trial during the week of April 1 st , when the defense
counsel was out of town, this caused a delay of no more than one week. And so, at most,
only seven days are attributable to Mr. Houston; and, because trial was set 12 days past
the 120-day deadline, the trial was still late. And so, Mr. Houston's conviction should be
reversed and this case remanded for dismissal.

CONCLUSION
In light of the above, Mr. Houston respectfully requests that this Court reverse his
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conviction for failure to prosecute within 120 days after the written request for
disposition of charges. Alternatively, Mr. Houston requests that this case be remanded
for further factual findings and conclusions on the 120-day disposition issue in this case.
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